Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (L) and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. (AFP Photo/How Hwee Young)

Facing trouble on its western borders, Russia is pinning its hopes on the East. Moscow has initiated its own Asian pivot, making efforts to cultivate political allies and economic partners in Asia.

This eastward drive has been in the making for quite a while. In the second half of the 2000’s, Moscow began taking steps to develop the long-neglected Russian Far East, expand economic cooperation with East Asia, and diversify away from economically stagnant Europe.

At the time, Moscow’s pursuit of closer ties with Asia seemed somewhat half-hearted and did not produce substantial results.

It was not until the arrival of the Ukraine crisis and subsequent Western sanctions that Russia’s relations with Asia became critical. China was the most obvious option to turn to, especially considering that Beijing remained neutral regarding Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine.

Putin’s visits to China in May and November 2014, as well as multiple high-level meetings during the past year, underscore the growing closeness between the two great powers. They concluded a host of agreements in — among other fields — the energy, finance, and high-tech sectors. The strengthened ties between Moscow and Beijing were epitomised by a 30-year, US$400 billion deal to supply natural gas from eastern Russia to northeast China. At the same time, China’s imports of Russian oil skyrocketed by 36 per cent in 2014.

The central banks of the two countries signed a currency swap agreement worth RMB150 billion (US$25 billion), enabling Russia to draw on renminbi in case of need. And as leading Western agencies — such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch — downgraded Russia’s credit rating to junk or near-junk level, Chinese credit rating agency Dagong Global gave Russia’s Gazprom the highest AAA rating, enabling the Russian energy giant to place shares in Hong Kong.

In October 2014, while meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia and China were ‘natural partners and natural allies’.

There are areas in Asia where Russia and China have competing interests; particularly Central Asia where China’s growing economic presence has long worried Russia. But even here, Moscow and Beijing recently agreed to coordinate their flagship economic initiatives, the Russian-led Eurasian Union and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt.

Russia has been traditionally wary of the Chinese presence in its far east. Yet Moscow has now lifted tacit restrictions on Chinese investments and begun to actively court Chinese capital. In a landmark move in 2014, the Russian government agreed to sell Chinese companies minority stakes in the country’s most lucrative oil field and the world’s third biggest copper field, both located in Eastern Siberia. Moscow is even willing to let Chinese investors into its holy of holies: a controlling ownership of Russia’s major strategic oil and gas fields.

Despite its seeming enthusiasm for intimacy with Beijing, Moscow is aware of the costs and risks of embracing China too closely. If Russia is seeking to diversify its Asian partnerships then Japan might be an ideal choice. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appears eager to improve relations with the northern neighbour, having met with Putin seven times during 2013 and 2014.

But Tokyo’s alliance with Washington places restrictions on how far it can advance in its rapprochement with Russia. Under American pressure, Japan introduced sanctions and indefinitely postponed a visit by Putin to Tokyo. If Russia’s relations with the West remain poor, Abe will hardly risk hosting Putin in 2015.

Unlike Japan, South Korea has refused to sanction Russia over Ukraine. The dialogue between Moscow and Seoul seems to be in a pretty good shape, with Russia occupying an important place in President Park Geun-Hye’s flagship ‘Eurasian initiative’.

Yet it is the other Korean state, the DPRK, that has lately seen the most remarkable progress in its relations with Russia. A flurry of high-level exchanges between Moscow and Pyongyang will culminate with Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia in May — his first trip abroad as head of state. After both being ostracised by the West, Russia and the DPRK now share an increased affinity. Increased support for North Korea may also serve as additional leverage for Moscow in the dealings with the West, Tokyo and Seoul.

In Southeast Asia, apart from its long-time friend Vietnam, Moscow looks to Singapore, which it sees not only as a potential investor and gateway into the Asia Pacific for Russian businesses, but also as a mentor on many modernisation issues.

In South Asia, Russia has scored a diplomatic success, securing the simultaneous admission of India and Pakistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in spite of a reluctant China. Meanwhile Moscow has managed to substantially improve its traditionally problematic relations with Islamabad, while remaining a close partner of Delhi.

Two main questions remain concerning Russia’s ongoing eastern pivot. First, will Moscow’s newfound interest in Asia prove durable when and if Russia somehow succeeds in normalising relations with the West? Second, will Russia’s Asian pivot engage not only China but with Asia more broadly? There is a mismatch between Moscow’s diplomatic activism towards other Asian countries and economic deliverables. Unless this changes, Russia faces the unenviable prospect of becoming just China’s raw material periphery.

Artyom Lukin is Associate Professor at the Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok.

Courtesy of East Asia Forum

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East Asia Forum is a platform for analysis and research on politics, economics, business, law, security, international relations and society relevant to public policy, centered on the Asia Pacific region.  For more information, please visit http://www.eastasiaforum.org/

]]> /2015/04/01/russia-turns-east-in-putins-new-asian-pivot/feed/ 0 Putin Xi Russia China emequity Russia's President Vladimir Putin (L) and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. (AFP Photo/How Hwee Young) /2015/02/27/north-korea-developing-submarine-capable-of-launching-ballistic-missile-kyodo-says/ /2015/02/27/north-korea-developing-submarine-capable-of-launching-ballistic-missile-kyodo-says/#comments Fri, 27 Feb 2015 06:53:23 +0000 /?p=6799 Continue reading →]]> North Korea is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) according to a report on Friday from Japan’s Kyodo News Agency, who cited a senior United States military commander.

According to Kyodo, Cecil Haney, a U.S. Navy admiral who currently serves as Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, made the remark during testimony at a hearing at U.S. congress.

The remark raises the credibility of a recent U.S. media report that the North conducted its first flight test of a new SLBM last month.

Haney said that North Korea is also developing a missile that can be fired from a mobile missile ejection launcher, the report said.

Haney also said that North Korea owns miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Photo courtesy of VOA.

Officials in Moscow say Kim Jong Un will attend celebrations in Russia in May marking the Soviet victory over Germany in World War II. The decision by the North Korean leader to go to Russia before visiting his chief ally China could indicate a breach in the Sino-Korean relationship.

The news that Kim Jong Un has confirmed his attendance for the celebration in May marking the end of the second world war came from the office of the Kremlin’s presidential spokesman. No official announcement has come from Pyongyang about the trip.

Kim has not made any overseas trips since coming to power in North Korea in late 2011 when he succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, who died suddenly.

Professor Andrei Lankov, a North Korea analyst with Kookmin University in Seoul, said that if the North Korean leader makes his first international trip to Russia, it will be seen as an act of defiance to a degree against China, the North’s chief ally and trading partner in the region.

“It’s clearly a sign to China and the entire world that North Korea is looking for better and closer ties with Russia. And it also wants to distance itself from China at least to some degree,” said Lankov.

There has also been speculation in the media that the North Korean leader may attend an international conference of heads of state in Indonesia in April.

Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing have been strained since Kim took over, especially since 2013 when North Korea defied international warnings and U.N. sanctions to conduct a third nuclear test.

Both China and Russia supported U.N. sanctions on the North for its nuclear and missile tests. But China has taken more of a leadership role in international diplomatic efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul, said Beijing may be withholding an invitation for Kim Jong Un to visit until Pyongyang yields to international pressure to curb its nuclear program and restart international talks.

He said China is concerned about criticism from the international community if they accept Kim Jong Un, as there has been no progress made on North Korea.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has not yet visited North Korea nor met Kim Jong Un in person. But last year he made a state visit to South Korea and has met President Park Geun-hye six times since 2012.

North Korea’s late leader Kim Jong Il visited Russia in 2011, but he paid more regular visits to China.

Courtesy of Voice of America

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un approved the plan of the asymmetric seven-day war with South Korea. To capture the neighboring state, the North Korean Army will need only seven days – the time period that would be enough not to give the United States an opportunity to get involved in the conflict.

Kim Jong-un ordered military commanders to create plans of operations for their units and conduct exercises. The authorities of the DPRK declared the year 2015 as “the year of the great war for reunification.”

The strategy approved by Kim Jong-un in 2012 envisages an asymmetrical war with the use of nuclear weapons.

Earlier, it was reported that Kim wrote a letter to the widow of former South Korean President Lee Hee-ho. In the letter, the leader of North Korea set out a hope for the two republics to unite.

At the same time, the South Korean authorities develop a response plan should the North decide to invade.

Courtesy of Pravda.Ru Copyright © 1999-2014, PRAVDA.Ru

ETFs: EWY

Image Credit: Flickr/ thierry ehrmann

Kim Jong-un may embark on his first ever foreign visit since assuming the title of North Korea’s Supreme Leader later this year. According to a report by The Korea Herald citing an anonymous South Korean diplomatic source, Kim has accepted an invitation from Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend a May ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War — specifically, the victory of Soviet forces over Nazi Germany.  “It was confirmed that North Korea gave a positive response to the Russian invitation for Kim Jong-un,” noted the source.

Should Kim travel to Moscow later this year, it would speak volumes about North Korea’s convergence with Russia. Back in 2011, most observers of North Korean affairs would have predicted that if and when Kim Jong-un left North Korea for an official visit, his destination almost without a shred of doubt would have been Beijing. However, beginning with the assassination of his uncle and erstwhile regime number two Jang Song-thaek in late-2013, relations between North Korea and China have grown increasingly frayed. Over the course of 2014, there were reports that a North Korean military academy had hung banners describing China as a “turncoat” and even an “enemy.” Additionally, Beijing has grown less overtly supportive of Pyongyang over the past year.

In the meantime, however, North Korea has expanded its official interactions with Russia. 2014 wasn’t the best of years for Russia’s acceptance on the international stage. Following its invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and its subsequent support for separatist Ukrainian rebels, Russia faced international isolation and sanctions from Western states. More recently, the collapse in global oil prices has placed the Russian economy on a precarious precipice, forcing Putin to seek reliable friends and partners the world over. While North Korea isn’t particularly known for its loyalty as an ally or as an arms customer (similar to, say, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria), Russia is likely looking to wield strategic influence over the ever-unpredictable Hermit Kingdom.

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The talks will focus on a number of bilateral issues, including North Korea’s nuclear problem. The North Korean envoy is expected to meet with Stephen Bosworth, the former United States Special Representative for North Korea Policy.

Relations between Pyongyang and Washington has recently aggravated on the backdrop of cyberattacks on Sony Pictures. The United States puts the blame for these attacks on North Korea. In early January, U.S. President Barack Obama signed a decree allowing the Department of the Treasury to impose sanctions against North Korean leaders and organizations. It was done as a response to the cyberattacks on the film company and over Washington’s general concern over Pyongyang’s policy. North Korea, in turn, said the U.S. sanctions were “counterproductive and would not weaken the country.” Pyongyang, according to a foreign ministry representative, “has nothing to do with the cyberattack.”

Courtesy of TASS

Courtesy of Sony.

The imbroglio over the new Sony film The Interview is a sideshow that reveals that the Obama Administration, like the Bush Administration before it, has lost the plot with regard to North Korea. The real game is to stop, reverse and end North Korea’s nuclear weapons breakout. Its handling of The Interview has managed to distract the US government from this strategic imperative, increase the risk of war, including nuclear war, and made it harder than ever to advance American vital security interests in relation to North Korea’s nuclear threat.

The real video we should be watching is not The Interview but US Strategic Command’s deterrence symposium from August 14, 2014. At minute 23.35, recently retired US Major General John MacDonald who served until recently in US Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command/UN Command in Korea, advocates including assassination of North Koreans in STRATCOM’s policy options kitbag for dealing with Kim Jong Un over the next three years.

Unlike The Interview, this movie is not satirical, nor is it fictional. It is posted by US Strategic Command, the military command that plans for using nuclear weapons against North Korea. Cyber Command that may lead US retaliation against North Korea is a component of Strategic Command.

Stratcom.mil is the one website that we can be assured that the North Koreans monitor on a daily basis. This video is on a US government website. As Commander-in-Chief, President Obama owns this assassination video.

That it appears on-line today reveals the same attitude towards managing the North Korean threat as the Administration’s handling of The Interview. If Sony’s internal emails are to be believed, a senior US State Department official advised Sony CEO Michael Lynton that because the US-DPRK relationship was already so toxic, releasing a movie showing KJU’s head being blown off by a grenade removed from Seth Rogen’s rectum would not do any additional damage to US security interests in the region.

He was wrong. There were and are consequential and potentially catastrophic risks, and there was no reason to not tender sound advice to that effect to Sony’s CEO who at least asked for guidance. The careless advice reportedly given to Sony is an indicator of the Obama Administration’s attitude toward the DPRK which can be described fairly as negligent. Nothing can be done, so what we do doesn’t matter.

Many professional cyber-crime experts remain skeptical that the FBI could attribute the attack or threats to North Korea, especially given its apparent overnight change of heart from December 19 to December 20, 2014, leading some to speculate that this was driven politically. Perhaps the White House was driven by the need to divert journalists from focusing on the CIA torture story, or to counter accusations that by recognizing Cuba, President Obama is soft on dictatorships. However, I surmise that President Obama had some non-circumstantial, non-cyber evidence to link the North to the attack and the threat to theaters that he referred to as justifying his threat to retaliate. The reason to do so is that Obama would be well aware of the threat of political blowback if he had relied solely on unreliable, weak, or even deceptive cyber-evidence and would not have risked political capital in order to accuse North Korea of the attack.

This issue is peripheral to the topic of this essay, however. Even if the FBI’s attribution is completely accurate, it is still only some combination of cyber-vandalism and non-credible threat that is at stake which does not justify escalating the issue and not attending to the main game, the issue of nuclear war and proliferation in Northeast Asia.

It is also possible that the United States is multi-tasking by playing more than one game at a time. President Obama’s threat to retaliate against North Korean-controlled computer infrastructure that is physically located in or transiting China may be an attempt to pressure China to address its earlier request that it address Chinese hacking against American firms, using North Korea as the lever. The White House may also be counting on China to act unilaterally against North Korea’s cyber capacities in response to US requests to this effect due to the threat of American cyber-attack on this infrastructure located in China if they don’t, or simply because China may be upset that North Korea’s abuse of its access to China is drawing attention to China and can be ended at little or no cost.

Unfortunately, the US response to the Sony attacks does not offer China any evidence of a shift in the American attitude towards the DPRK or of how to solve the DPRK nuclear issue or to bring to an end the US-Korean War in the form of a peace treaty. In short, the US move is disingenuous, China knows it, the DPRK knows it, and the Sony-Rogen low point in American handling of the US-DPRK relationship will, like any protracted tempest in a teapot, eventually blow away—provided it doesn’t escalate into war.

The White House’s improvised exploitation of The Interview to try to undermine the North Korean regime is only the most extreme example of increasing American hostility towards the North. In the last year, the United States has also supported strongly a push to indict the North Korean leadership, including Kim Jong Un, for crimes against humanity and other human rights violations, documented in the Kirby report to the United Nations. These recall similar efforts during the Cold War. In the sixties, for example, the United States and its South Korean ally dropped millions of anti-regime pamphlets into the North. The United States also trained South Korean covert teams and agents to go to the North to try to destabilize and overthrow the North, as was revealed in Potshards (pp. 37-38), Don Gregg’s recent autobiography. None succeeded; as far as is known, none returned either.

During the Bush Administration, the US Treasury launched financial sanctions that were designed to prevent negotiated agreements to end the North’s nuclear weapons, and were aimed at regime change. As Robert Zarate, the architect of the sanctions declared in his recent book, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (pages 311, 352), these sanctions where a purposeful act of financial warfare. Thus, the DPRK has now confronted a Republican and Democratic Administration that has heightened American hostility towards the DPRK, and has increased North Koreans political and economic isolation. The Obama Administration has done nothing to implement Justice Kirby’s carefully crafted recommendations (summary report, sections 25, 92-94) that states facilitate increased civil society engagement with the North, and that they also recognize and act on their own contribution over the decades to the state of tension in the peninsula that makes it all but inevitable that horrific conditions will continue in the North given the risks associated with any structural transformation to a less oppressive, modernizing political and economic system. Indeed, US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power turned up the vilification volume against the North in her December 22, 2014 speech at the UN Security Council.

Unlike the Sony sideshow, managing the national security dimensions of the US relationship with North Korea is an urgent, vital interest. The retaliation threatened by Obama, whether or not it comes to pass, will have counterproductive impact in Pyongyang. The North Koreans are fearful of pre-emptive nuclear and conventional strikes for many reasons. These include specific reference to North Korea as a candidate for preventive strike in the US 2010 announced nuclear declaratory doctrine, and the long trail of US hostility expressed in words and deed towards North Korea. Much of this hostility is deserved given North Korea’s own bad faith, outrageous actions, and inflammatory and irresponsible rhetoric. Some is cultural, based on a realistic appreciation that North Korea embodies the antithesis of values that define what it is to be American. And some is purely ideological, based on American misreading of North Korea and responding to stereotypes and rabid fear-mongering.

But some of North Korea’s actions also respond to what Americans say and do. General MacDonald is not the only one to say that the United States should be in the business of assassinating North Koreans. RAND Corporation’s Bruce Bennett, for example, reportedly told Sony in June 2014 that the only way to get rid of the North Korean regime is to assassinate its leader. Moreover, Sony CEO Lynton asserted that a senior US official agreed with Bennett’s views (the State Department declined to clarify what this official said although it did say that he had not viewed the movie). Bennett also told Sony that the narrative of the rise of a “free North Korea” including the killing of Kim in The Interview should be kept so that it could leak into North Korea as a samizdat DVD that would destabilize North Korea. (According to the leaked emails, Rogen later modified the killing imagery as follows: “We took out three out of four face embers,” Rogen writes of shrapnel set to hit Kim’s face. “Reduced the hair burning by 50%, and significantly darkened the chunks of Kim’s head.”).

It is urgent to correct the improvised United States response to the Sony attack and its aftermath. The situation is now spiraling out of control and is already beyond fair game in Washington’s partisan politics. The reality is that no-one knows who is responsible for the escalation dominance in the cyber warfare between the United States and the DPRK

According to Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, there are no clear international rules or even norms that demarcate commercial or vandalistic cyber-attacks from cyber-warfare, unlike in kinetic warfare in Korea where a military demarcation line is physically inscribed on the strategic landscape. President Obama has thrown down the gauntlet to the DPRK by suggesting that Sony should show the movie, thereby revealing at the same time his own estimate that the alleged DPRK threats to the safety of movie-goers was not credible. Sony has now released The Interview live on-line on Google Movies and YouTube movies, and in Christmas Day limited in-theater showings in the United States.

That the DPRK will respond is entirely predictable, especially since President Obama’s promised retaliation involves information warfare aimed at spreading anti-regime propaganda inside the DPRK or converting The Interview into some kind of DVD samizdat. Indeed, the DPRK has already threatened to respond. It is a short distance from the merely symbolic cyber-domain to kinetic and radioactive battlefields in a place as heavily armed as in Korea. Whether the DPRK Internet link outage on December 22 2014 was the first American retaliatory shot (or some third party denial of service attack) is anyone’s guess. Similarly, no-one knows if the hacking of two South Korean nuclear power plants on December 22, 2014 was by North Korea or other hackers. But these events show just how dangerous the game being played over a fictional assassination movie has become.

It is not obvious who will have the last laugh in this pathetic Sony sideshow. Certainly it will undermine US reputation for sound strategic decision-making and an ability to maintain stability in the Korean Peninsula, let alone facilitate negotiations to capture and reverse North Korean nuclear armament. Assuredly, the United States will not gain reputation abroad, especially in East Asia, by defending a movie that depicts the assassination of a living head of state, especially one as potentially dangerous as Kim Jong Un.

Each day that passes, North Korea is enriching uranium that can be used in nuclear weapons, it is improving its missile and other delivery systems, and it is reconstructing its plutonium-producing reactor. From this perspective, time is on North Korea’s side, not that of the United States. This is what matters in terms of vital national security interests, not the fate of The Interview.

The United States, which is still the world’s only superpower, can still shape Kim Jong Un’s strategic calculus, rather than merely imagine his denouement via its cultural industry. There is no shortage of small, medium, and large strategic options for the United States to reduce the danger of war and nuclear war involving North Korea.

Admittedly, it is not easy to negotiate with North Korea; but it has been done before successfully, and must be done again. Doing so means determining how to hold North Korea accountable for its alleged cyber-vandalism and reduce the probability of war, nuclear war, and nuclear proliferation at the same time. Everything else should be set aside.

There is simply no substitute for the tedious, painstaking work of constructing a meaningful diplomatic and security relationship with the North Koreans. Not doing so is strategically negligent.

Appendix 1:PRESIDENT OBAMA’S YEAR-END PRESS CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 19, 2014

On December 19, President Obama held a year-end press conference at the White House. Below are excerpts from that press conference related to U.S. foreign policy and international engagement. A full transcript of the press conference will be available on the White House website.

THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of the Press Secretary
, Washington, DC 
- December 19, 2014

Q: Thank you, Mr. President. I’ll start on North Korea — that seems to be the biggest topic today. What does a proportional response look like to the Sony hack? And did Sony make the right decision in pulling the movie? Or does that set a dangerous precedent when faced with this kind of situation?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me address the second question first. Sony is a corporation. It suffered significant damage. There were threats against its employees. I am sympathetic to the concerns that they faced. Having said all that, yes, I think they made a mistake.

In this interconnected, digital world, there are going to be opportunities for hackers to engage in cyber assaults both in the private sector and the public sector. Now, our first order of business is making sure that we do everything to harden sites and prevent those kinds of attacks from taking place. When I came into office, I stood up a cybersecurity interagency team to look at everything that we could at the government level to prevent these kinds of attacks. We’ve been coordinating with the private sector, but a lot more needs to be done. We’re not even close to where we need to be.

And one of the things in the New Year that I hope Congress is prepared to work with us on is strong cybersecurity laws that allow for information-sharing across private sector platforms, as well as the public sector, so that we are incorporating best practices and preventing these attacks from happening in the first place.

But even as we get better, the hackers are going to get better, too. Some of them are going to be state actors; some of them are going to be non-state actors. All of them are going to be sophisticated and many of them can do some damage.

We cannot have a society in which some dictator someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States. Because if somebody is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing when they see a documentary that they don’t like, or news reports that they don’t like. Or even worse, imagine if producers and distributors and others start engaging in self-censorship because they don’t want to offend the sensibilities of somebody whose sensibilities probably need to be offended.

So that’s not who we are. That’s not what America is about.

…But let’s talk of the specifics of what we now know. The FBI announced today and we can confirm that North Korea engaged in this attack. I think it says something interesting about North Korea that they decided to have the state mount an all-out assault on a movie studio because of a satirical movie starring Seth Rogen and James Flacco [Franco]. (Laughter.) I love Seth and I love James, but the notion that that was a threat to them I think gives you some sense of the kind of regime we’re talking about here.

They caused a lot of damage, and we will respond. We will respond proportionally, and we’ll respond in a place and time and manner that we choose. It’s not something that I will announce here today at a press conference.

Appendix 2: FBI PRESS RELEASE UPDATE ON SONY INVESTIGATION

Update on Sony Investigation, Washington, DC – December 19, 2014

Today, the FBI would like to provide an update on the status of our investigation into the cyber attack targeting Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE). In late November, SPE confirmed that it was the victim of a cyber attack that destroyed systems and stole large quantities of personal and commercial data. A group calling itself the “Guardians of Peace” claimed responsibility for the attack and subsequently issued threats against SPE, its employees, and theaters that distribute its movies.

The FBI has determined that the intrusion into SPE’s network consisted of the deployment of destructive malware and the theft of proprietary information as well as employees’ personally identifiable information and confidential communications. The attacks also rendered thousands of SPE’s computers inoperable, forced SPE to take its entire computer network offline, and significantly disrupted the company’s business operations.

After discovering the intrusion into its network, SPE requested the FBI’s assistance. Since then, the FBI has been working closely with the company throughout the investigation. Sony has been a great partner in the investigation, and continues to work closely with the FBI. Sony reported this incident within hours, which is what the FBI hopes all companies will do when facing a cyber attack. Sony’s quick reporting facilitated the investigators’ ability to do their jobs, and ultimately to identify the source of these attacks.

As a result of our investigation, and in close collaboration with other U.S. government departments and agencies, the FBI now has enough information to conclude that the North Korean government is responsible for these actions. While the need to protect sensitive sources and methods precludes us from sharing all of this information, our conclusion is based, in part, on the following:

• Technical analysis of the data deletion malware used in this attack revealed links to other malware that the FBI knows North Korean actors previously developed. For example, there were similarities in specific lines of code, encryption algorithms, data deletion methods, and compromised networks.
• The FBI also observed significant overlap between the infrastructure used in this attack and other malicious cyber activity the U.S. government has previously linked directly to North Korea. For example, the FBI discovered that several Internet protocol (IP) addresses associated with known North Korean infrastructure communicated with IP addresses that were hardcoded into the data deletion malware used in this attack.
• Separately, the tools used in the SPE attack have similarities to a cyber attack in March of last year against South Korean banks and media outlets, which was carried out by North Korea.

We are deeply concerned about the destructive nature of this attack on a private sector entity and the ordinary citizens who worked there. Further, North Korea’s attack on SPE reaffirms that cyber threats pose one of the gravest national security dangers to the United States. Though the FBI has seen a wide variety and increasing number of cyber intrusions, the destructive nature of this attack, coupled with its coercive nature, sets it apart. North Korea’s actions were intended to inflict significant harm on a U.S. business and suppress the right of American citizens to express themselves. Such acts of intimidation fall outside the bounds of acceptable state behavior. The FBI takes seriously any attempt—whether through cyber-enabled means, threats of violence, or otherwise—to undermine the economic and social prosperity of our citizens.

The FBI stands ready to assist any U.S. company that is the victim of a destructive cyber attack or breach of confidential business information. Further, the FBI will continue to work closely with multiple departments and agencies as well as with domestic, foreign, and private sector partners who have played a critical role in our ability to trace this and other cyber threats to their source. Working together, the FBI will identify, pursue, and impose costs and consequences on individuals, groups, or nation states who use cyber means to threaten the United States or U.S. interests.

Appendix 3: SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY ON CYBER-ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KERRY Condemning Cyber-Attack by North Korea – 19 December 2014

The United States condemns North Korea for the cyber-attack targeting Sony Pictures Entertainment and the unacceptable threats against movie theatres and moviegoers. These actions are a brazen attempt by an isolated regime to suppress free speech and stifle the creative expression of artists beyond the borders of its own country.

Freedom of expression is at the center of America’s values and a founding principle of our Bill of Rights. We’re a country where artists openly mock and criticize the powerful, including our own government. We don’t always like what they say about us or about others, and sometimes we’re even deeply offended. But those offenses have always taken a backseat to freedom of expression. That’s why the United States is and always will be a staunch advocate for and protector of the right of artists to express themselves freely and creatively. Whatever one’s system of government or views about free expression, there is absolutely no justification whatsoever for an attack like this.

We are deeply concerned about the destructive nature of this state sponsored cyber-attack targeting a commercial entity and its employees in the United States. These lawless acts of intimidation demonstrate North Korea’s flagrant disregard for international norms. Threats in cyberspace pose one of the greatest national security challenges to the United States, and North Korea’s actions – intended to inflict significant economic damage and suppress free speech – are well beyond the bounds of acceptable state behavior in cyberspace. This provocative and unprecedented attack and subsequent threats only strengthen our resolve to continue to work with partners around the world to strengthen cybersecurity, promote norms of acceptable state behavior, uphold freedom of expression, and ensure that the Internet remains open, interoperable, secure and reliable. We encourage our allies and partners to stand with us as we defend the values of all of our people in the face of state-sponsored intimidation.

Appendix 4: ADMIRAL KIRBY STATES THERE IS NO DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN CYBER VANDALISM AND CYBER-WAR

Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room – December 19, 2014

QUESTION: Thank you Hey, general admiral [sic], a question about North Korea. There’s many reports out there about the speculation of them being behind cyber attacks here in the United States. I was just curious from a military perspective what the U.S. military understanding is of North Korea’s cyber capabilities? And are they a cyber threat from a military perspective?

KIRBY: Well, without speaking to anything specific with regard to Sony Pictures, as you know, we take cyber threats very, very seriously. Cyber threats come from any number of state and non-state actors. I won’t get into, you know, a laundry list here today, but this is something the secretary takes very seriously. It’s why he has devoted so much of his energy to the cyber domain. And, I mean, it’s something we’re constantly mindful of. But I — I don’t — you know, it’s also — it’s also a domain where, you know, you have to be very circumspect about the degree to which — the specificity to which you talk about both the threats, challenges, and of course whatever responses are available to you.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?

Has the U.S. Cyber Command been tasked at all with assisting the FBI or any part of the government in its investigation into the Sony hack?

KIRBY: This is an FBI investigation. I’m not aware of any particular assistance rendered by DOD. That said, we have been part of the interagency discussions about — about this incident.

QUESTION: Just a follow-on North Korea. The FBI is blaming North Korea for the attack, and says it has evidence. At what point is it an act of war? And at what point does U.S. Cyber Command react?

KIRBY: First of all, I know of no official determination about the — that’s been made about the source of the attacks on Sony Pictures. So, I’m not in a position to speculate one way or the other. It’s an ongoing investigation and I wouldn’t get ahead of the FBI on that. As I said, we’re part of the interagency discussion about the incident and about options that may be available.

I’m also, you know, not — not able to lay out in any specificity for you what would be or wouldn’t be an act of war in the cyber domain. We take — it’s not like there’s a demarcation line that exists in some sort of fixed space on what is or isn’t. The cyber domain remains challenging — remains very fluid. Part of the reason why it’s such a challenging domain for us is because there aren’t internationally accepted norms and protocols. And that’s something that, you know, we here in the Defense Department have been certainly arguing for.

This is a revised and expanded version of an article that appeared at the Napsnet Policy Forum.

Peter Hayes is Co-founder and Executive Director of Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability; Honorary Professor at the Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia, and an Asia-Pacific Journal Contributing Editor. Recent publications include Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Global Abolition, and Korea and The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia (with Michael Hamel-Green)

“U.S. Strategic Negligence, North Korea and the Sony Sideshow”, was originally published in The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 52, No. 2, December 29, 2014.

The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus is an in-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific and the world by highlighting  geopolitics, economics, history, society, culture, international relations and forces for change in the modern and contemporary Asia-Pacific.  For more information, please visit http://japanfocus.org/home